Dictatorship

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Revision as of 01:31, 3 September 2025
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[td]{{Further|Autocracy|Cult of personality}}{{See also|Personalismo|Dynasty#Hereditary dictatorship}}[/td]
[td]{{Further|Autocracy|Cult of personality}}{{See also|Personalismo|Dynasty#Hereditary dictatorship}}[/td]
[td][[File:The statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang (april 2012).jpg|thumb|left|Citizens of North Korea bow to statues of former dictators [[Kim Il Sung]] and [[Kim Jong Il]] in 2012.]][/td]
[td][[File:The statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang (april 2012).jpg|thumb|left|Citizens of North Korea bow to statues of former dictators [[Kim Il Sung]] and [[Kim Jong Il]] in 2012.]][/td]
[td][/td] [td]{{multiple image[/td] [td]| total_width = 350[/td] [td]| image1 = HafezalAssadspeech1_(cropped).jpg[/td] [td]| image2 = Bashar2000.png[/td] [td]| footer = [[Ba'athist Syria]] was ruled by the highly personality generational dictatorship of [[Hafez al-Assad]] (r. 1971–2000) and his son [[Bashar al-Assad]] (r. 2000 – 2024) between the late Cold War in the 1970s<ref>{{Cite book |last=Khamis, B. Gold, Vaughn |first=Sahar, Paul, Katherine |title=The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-19-976441-9 |editor-last=Auerbach, Castronovo |editor-first=Jonathan, Russ |location=198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 |pages=422 |chapter=22. Propaganda in Egypt and Syria's "Cyberwars": Contexts, Actors, Tools, and Tactics}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Wedeen |first=Lisa |title=Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=2015 |isbn=978-0-226-33337-3 |location=Chicago |pages= |chapter= |doi=10.7208/chicago/978022345536.001.0001|doi-broken-date=12 July 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Meininghaus |first=Esther |title=Creating Consent in Ba'thist Syria: Women and Welfare in a Totalitarian State |publisher=I. B. Tauris |year=2016 |isbn=978-1-78453-115-7 |pages= |chapter=}}</ref> until 2024.<ref name="fall">{{cite news |title=Syrian rebels topple President Assad, prime minister calls for free elections |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middl...captured-homs-set-sights-damascus-2024-12-07/ |access-date=8 December 2024 |publisher=Reuters |date=8 December 2024}}</ref>[/td] [td]}}[/td] [td][/td]
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[td]'''Personalist dictatorships'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> are regimes in which all of the power lies in the hands of a single individual.<ref name=":12" /> They differ from other forms of dictatorships in that the dictator has greater access to key political positions and the government's [[treasury]], and they are more commonly subject to the discretion of the dictator. Personalist dictators may be members of the military or leaders of a political party, but neither the military nor the party exercises power independently from the dictator. In personalist dictatorships, the elite corps are usually made up of close friends or family members of the dictator, who typically handpicks these individuals to serve their posts.{{sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|pp=215–216}}<ref>{{cite journal|last=Peceny|first=Mark|date=2003|title=Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists.|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume= 97| issue = 2|pages= 339–42|oclc=208155326|doi=10.1017/s0003055403000716|s2cid=145169371}}</ref> These dictatorships often emerge either from loosely organized seizures of power, giving the leader opportunity to consolidate power, or from democratically elected leaders in countries with weak institutions, giving the leader opportunity to change the constitution. Personalist dictatorships are more common in Sub-Saharan Africa due to less established institutions in the region.{{sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|pp=42–45}} There has been an increase in personalist dictatorships since the end of the Cold War.<ref name=":12">{{Citation |last=Frantz |first=Erica |title=Personalist Dictatorship |date=2024 |work=The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.8 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.8 |isbn=978-0-19-887199-6 |quote=Personalist dictatorships are regimes in which a single individual controls access to political office and influence over policy, and no institutions exist that are autonomous of this individual (Geddes 2003). This contrasts with other more institutionalized forms of authoritarianism, where politics may be dictated by a single political party (as in dominant-party dictatorships) or a military junta (as in military dictatorships). Political parties may exist in personalist dictatorships, but they largely lack political autonomy.|url-access=subscription }}</ref>[/td]
[td]'''Personalist dictatorships'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> are regimes in which all of the power lies in the hands of a single individual.<ref name=":12" /> They differ from other forms of dictatorships in that the dictator has greater access to key political positions and the government's [[treasury]], and they are more commonly subject to the discretion of the dictator. Personalist dictators may be members of the military or leaders of a political party, but neither the military nor the party exercises power independently from the dictator. In personalist dictatorships, the elite corps are usually made up of close friends or family members of the dictator, who typically handpicks these individuals to serve their posts.{{sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|pp=215–216}}<ref>{{cite journal|last=Peceny|first=Mark|date=2003|title=Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists.|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume= 97| issue = 2|pages= 339–42|oclc=208155326|doi=10.1017/s0003055403000716|s2cid=145169371}}</ref> These dictatorships often emerge either from loosely organized seizures of power, giving the leader opportunity to consolidate power, or from democratically elected leaders in countries with weak institutions, giving the leader opportunity to change the constitution. Personalist dictatorships are more common in Sub-Saharan Africa due to less established institutions in the region.{{sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|pp=42–45}} There has been an increase in personalist dictatorships since the end of the Cold War.<ref name=":12">{{Citation |last=Frantz |first=Erica |title=Personalist Dictatorship |date=2024 |work=The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.8 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.8 |isbn=978-0-19-887199-6 |quote=Personalist dictatorships are regimes in which a single individual controls access to political office and influence over policy, and no institutions exist that are autonomous of this individual (Geddes 2003). This contrasts with other more institutionalized forms of authoritarianism, where politics may be dictated by a single political party (as in dominant-party dictatorships) or a military junta (as in military dictatorships). Political parties may exist in personalist dictatorships, but they largely lack political autonomy.|url-access=subscription }}</ref>[/td]
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[td]The shift in the power relation between the dictator and their inner circle has severe consequences for the behavior of such regimes as a whole. Personalist regimes diverge from other regimes when it comes to their longevity, methods of breakdown, levels of corruption, and proneness to conflicts. On average, they last twice as long as military dictatorships, but not as long as one-party dictatorships.<ref>{{Cite report |title=Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument |last=Geddes |first=Barbara |date=2004 |pages=18–19}}</ref> Personalist dictatorships also experience growth differently, as they often lack the institutions or qualified leadership to sustain an economy.<ref>Van den Bosch, Jeroen J. J., Personalist Rule in Africa and Other World Regions, (London-New York: Routledge, 2021): 13-16</ref>[/td]
[td]The shift in the power relation between the dictator and their inner circle has severe consequences for the behavior of such regimes as a whole. Personalist regimes diverge from other regimes when it comes to their longevity, methods of breakdown, levels of corruption, and proneness to conflicts. On average, they last twice as long as military dictatorships, but not as long as one-party dictatorships.<ref>{{Cite report |title=Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument |last=Geddes |first=Barbara |date=2004 |pages=18–19}}</ref> Personalist dictatorships also experience growth differently, as they often lack the institutions or qualified leadership to sustain an economy.<ref>Van den Bosch, Jeroen J. J., Personalist Rule in Africa and Other World Regions, (London-New York: Routledge, 2021): 13-16</ref>[/td]
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[td]== History ==[/td]
[td]== History ==[/td]

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