Talk:Somali Air Force

:Of course, progress and risks coexist, but, withdrawing the AU force without replacement, in my judgment, would indeed heighten the risk of catastrophic failure to a very high degree, because of (a) the AU, (b) Danab, and (c) Gorgor, only Gorgor might remain somewhat combat effective. [[User:Buckshot06|Buckshot06]] [[User_talk:Buckshot06|(talk)]] 11:35, 3 July 2025 (UTC)

:Of course, progress and risks coexist, but, withdrawing the AU force without replacement, in my judgment, would indeed heighten the risk of catastrophic failure to a very high degree, because of (a) the AU, (b) Danab, and (c) Gorgor, only Gorgor might remain somewhat combat effective. [[User:Buckshot06|Buckshot06]] [[User_talk:Buckshot06|(talk)]] 11:35, 3 July 2025 (UTC)

::Beyond Geriley, Somali forces remained in place at key Forward Operating Bases like Baardheere, Janale, Mahas, and Buulo Burde, Wargaadhi and so on, after ATMIS withdrawals. Reports from Goobjoog and DefenceWeb throughout late 2023 and early 2024 confirm that SNA units, often reinforced by Gorgor or regional forces, stayed and continued operations, not merely as symbolic placeholders. On Danab funding, while no exact figures have been released, Finance Minister Bihi Iman Egeh told Parliament that the Somali government “reallocate[d] resources and establish[ed] a new budget to cover their salaries” following U.S. cuts [https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2025/Mar/200544/u_s_cuts_funding_for_danab_special_forces_and_other_aid_to_somalia.aspx]. Regarding Full Operational Capability it is fair that official statements rarely use that exact phrase. However, the fact that SNA units have taken over bases, held them during al-Shabaab attacks, and launched ongoing operations suggests they are effectively functional. In Geriley’s case, contrary to the claim that it was seized, al-Shabaab attempted to take it but were swiftly repelled [https://shabellemedia.com/al-shabaab-attacks-geriley-base-after-au-troops-pullout/], [https://www.radiodalsan.com/al-shabaab-attacks-military-base-amid-atmis-withdrawal-plan/]. It was primarily Jubaland forces manning that base, not Danab or federal forces, so there is no reputational damage to the national army from that skirmish. As for Gorgor, they continue to conduct joint operations with Turkish-trained officers still embedded in tactics and planning, evidence of active capability rather than decline. So yes, the situation is mixed and still precarious in parts, but the notion of collapse simply does not match the facts on the ground. [[User:Majid8097|Majid8097]] ([[User talk:Majid8097|talk]]) 12:59, 3 July 2025 (UTC)

::Beyond Geriley, Somali forces remained in place at key Forward Operating Bases like Baardheere, Janale, Mahas, and Buulo Burde, Wargaadhi and so on, after ATMIS withdrawals. Reports from Goobjoog and DefenceWeb throughout late 2023 and early 2024 confirm that SNA units, often reinforced by Gorgor or regional forces, stayed and continued operations, not merely as symbolic placeholders. On Danab funding, while no exact figures have been released, Finance Minister Bihi Iman Egeh told Parliament that the Somali government “reallocate[d] resources and establish[ed] a new budget to cover their salaries” following U.S. cuts [https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2025/Mar/200544/u_s_cuts_funding_for_danab_special_forces_and_other_aid_to_somalia.aspx]. Regarding Full Operational Capability it is fair that official statements rarely use that exact phrase. However, the fact that SNA units have taken over bases, held them during al-Shabaab attacks, and launched ongoing operations suggests they are effectively functional. In Geriley’s case, contrary to the claim that it was seized, al-Shabaab attempted to take it but were swiftly repelled [https://shabellemedia.com/al-shabaab-attacks-geriley-base-after-au-troops-pullout/], [https://www.radiodalsan.com/al-shabaab-attacks-military-base-amid-atmis-withdrawal-plan/]. It was primarily Jubaland forces manning that base, not Danab or federal forces, so there is no reputational damage to the national army from that skirmish. As for Gorgor, they continue to conduct joint operations with Turkish-trained officers still embedded in tactics and planning, evidence of active capability rather than decline. So yes, the situation is mixed and still precarious in parts, but the notion of collapse simply does not match the facts on the ground. [[User:Majid8097|Majid8097]] ([[User talk:Majid8097|talk]]) 12:59, 3 July 2025 (UTC)

:::The NYT, Guled, and the globalobservatory sources are not saying there is collapse *now.* :::Neither am I. What they point towards, is that in the same way that the [[Fall of Kabul (2023)|Afghan government collapsed after the U.S. troops withdrew]]; [[1975 spring offensive|the South Vietnamese Govt collapsed to PAVN after the U.S. troops withdrew]]; that half the Iraqi Army was destroyed by ISIS suddenly three years after the U.S. withdrew; and that Goma fell to M23 after the UN shirked in 2012, leading to FARDC shirking, is that there is a significant risk of collapse if the AU force is withdrawn. [[User:Buckshot06|Buckshot06]] [[User_talk:Buckshot06|(talk)]] 07:26, 5 July 2025 (UTC)

:::The NYT, Guled, and the globalobservatory sources are not saying there is collapse *now.*

:::Neither am I. What they point towards, is that in the same way that the [[Fall of Kabul (2021)|Afghan government collapsed after the U.S. troops withdrew]]; [[1975 spring offensive|the South Vietnamese Govt collapsed to PAVN after the U.S. troops withdrew]]; that [[Islamic State invasion of Iraq|half the Iraqi Army was destroyed by ISIS suddenly three years after the U.S. withdrew]]; and that Goma fell to M23 after the UN shirked in 2012, leading to FARDC shirking, is that there is a significant risk of collapse if the AU force is withdrawn. [[User:Buckshot06|Buckshot06]] [[User_talk:Buckshot06|(talk)]] 07:26, 5 July 2025 (UTC)

== Should claims affecting the reputation of the Somali Armed Forces and government be treated as true solely because a “reliable source” reports them? ==

== Should claims affecting the reputation of the Somali Armed Forces and government be treated as true solely because a “reliable source” reports them? ==