Problem of evil

The problem of evil is generally formulated in two forms: the '''logical problem of evil''' and the '''evidential problem of evil'''. The logical form of the argument tries to show a logical impossibility in the coexistence of a god and evil,<ref name="Stanford" /><ref name="IepLogical"/> while the evidential form tries to show that, given the evil in the world, it is improbable that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and a wholly good god.<ref name="IepEvidential" /> Concerning the evidential problem, many [[Theodicy|theodicies]] have been proposed. One accepted theodicy is to appeal to the strong account of the compensation theodicy. This view holds that the primary benefit of evils, in addition to their compensation in the afterlife, can reject the evidential problem of evil.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mousavirad |first=Seyyed Jaaber |date=2022-07-02 |title=Theory of Compensation and Problem of Evil; a New Defense |url=https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3357 |journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Religion |volume=14 |issue=2 |doi=10.24204/ejpr.2022.3357 |issn=1689-8311}}</ref> The problem of evil has been extended to non-human life forms, to include suffering of non-human animal species from [[natural evil]]s and human [[animal cruelty|cruelty]] against them.<ref name=inwagenp120/>

The problem of evil is generally formulated in two forms: the '''logical problem of evil''' and the '''evidential problem of evil'''. The logical form of the argument tries to show a logical impossibility in the coexistence of a god and evil,<ref name="Stanford" /><ref name="IepLogical"/> while the evidential form tries to show that, given the evil in the world, it is improbable that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and a wholly good god.<ref name="IepEvidential" /> Concerning the evidential problem, many [[Theodicy|theodicies]] have been proposed. One accepted theodicy is to appeal to the strong account of the compensation theodicy. This view holds that the primary benefit of evils, in addition to their compensation in the afterlife, can reject the evidential problem of evil.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mousavirad |first=Seyyed Jaaber |date=2022-07-02 |title=Theory of Compensation and Problem of Evil; a New Defense |url=https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3357 |journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Religion |volume=14 |issue=2 |doi=10.24204/ejpr.2022.3357 |issn=1689-8311}}</ref> The problem of evil has been extended to non-human life forms, to include suffering of non-human animal species from [[natural evil]]s and human [[animal cruelty|cruelty]] against them.<ref name=inwagenp120/>

According to scholars,{{efn| Attributed to multiple sources:<ref name="2009Meister"/><ref name="auto">Howard-Snyder, Daniel; O'Leary-Hawthorne, John (1998). "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense". International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 44 (1): 1–21. {{doi|10.1023/A:1003210017171}}. {{ISSN|1572-8684}}.</ref><ref name="auto1">Alston, William P. (1991). "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition". Philosophical Perspectives. 5: 29–67. {{doi|10.2307/2214090}}. {{ISSN|1758-2245}}. {{JSTOR|2214090}}. {{S2CID|16744068}}.</ref> }} most philosophers see the logical problem of evil as having been rebutted by various defenses.<ref name="2009Meister">{{cite book |last1=Meister |first1=Chad |title=Introducing Philosophy of Religion |date=2009 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=9781134141791 |page=134}}</ref><ref name="auto"/><ref name="auto1"/>

According to scholars, most philosophers see the logical problem of evil as having been rebutted by various defenses.<ref name="2009Meister">{{cite book |last1=Meister |first1=Chad |title=Introducing Philosophy of Religion |date=2009 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=9781134141791 |page=134}}</ref><ref name="auto"/><ref name="auto1"/>

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