Operation IA Feature

==Criticism==

==Criticism==

Two days prior to the program's approval [[Nathaniel Davis]], the Assistant Secretary of State, told [[Henry Kissinger]], the [[United States Secretary of State]], that he believed maintaining the secrecy of IA Feature would be impossible. Davis correctly predicted the [[Soviet Union]] would respond by increasing its involvement in Angola, leading to more violence and negative publicity for the United States. When Ford approved the program Davis resigned.<ref name="davis">Brown, Seyom. ''The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton'', 1994. Page 303.</ref> [[John Stockwell (CIA officer)|John Stockwell]], the CIA's station chief in Angola, echoed Davis' criticism saying the program needed to be expanded to be successful, but the program was already too large to be kept out of the public eye. Davis' deputy and former U.S. ambassador to [[Chile]], [[Edward Mulcahy (State Department official)|Edward Mulcahy]], also opposed direct involvement. Mulcahy presented three options for U.S. policy towards Angola on May 13, 1975. Mulcahy believed the Ford administration could use diplomacy to campaign against foreign aid to the [[Communist]] People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola ([[MPLA]]), refuse to take sides in factional fighting, or increase support for the FNLA and UNITA. He warned however that supporting UNITA would not sit well with [[Mobutu Sese Seko]], the ruler of [[Zaire]].<ref name="start"/><ref name="mulcahy">Jussi Hanhimäki. ''The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy'', 2004. Page 408.</ref>

Two days prior to the program's approval [[Nathaniel Davis]], the Assistant Secretary of State, told [[Henry Kissinger]], the [[United States Secretary of State]], that he believed maintaining the secrecy of IA Feature would be impossible. Davis correctly predicted the [[Soviet Union]] would respond by increasing its involvement in Angola, leading to more violence and negative publicity for the United States. When Ford approved the program Davis resigned.<ref name="davis">Brown, Seyom. ''The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton'', 1994. Page 303.</ref> [[John Stockwell (CIA officer)|John Stockwell]], the Chief of the CIA's Angola Task Force at Langley, echoed Davis' criticism saying the program needed to be expanded to be successful, but the program was already too large to be kept out of the public eye. Davis' deputy and former U.S. ambassador to [[Chile]], [[Edward Mulcahy (State Department official)|Edward Mulcahy]], also opposed direct involvement. Mulcahy presented three options for U.S. policy towards Angola on May 13, 1975. Mulcahy believed the Ford administration could use diplomacy to campaign against foreign aid to the [[Communist]] People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola ([[MPLA]]), refuse to take sides in factional fighting, or increase support for the FNLA and UNITA. He warned however that supporting UNITA would not sit well with [[Mobutu Sese Seko]], the ruler of [[Zaire]].<ref name="start"/><ref name="mulcahy">Jussi Hanhimäki. ''The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy'', 2004. Page 408.</ref>

==Clark Amendment==

==Clark Amendment==