Aphantasia

In 2024, a research team led by Jonathan Rhodes from the [[University of Plymouth]] assessed the imagery abilities of over 300 athletes finding a small sample of 27 who had aphantasia or low imagery abilities. The researchers developed a training program over six weeks to improve imagery ability, finding that it can be significantly improved for the majority of participants.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Rhodes J, May J, Nedza K, Clements L | title = Imagery training for athletes with low imagery abilities | date = April 2024 |journal=Journal of Applied Sport Psychology | volume = 36 | issue = 5 |pages=831–844 |doi=10.1080/10413200.2024.2337019| doi-access=free }}</ref> In addition, the research of Keogh and Pearson's<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Keogh |first1=Rebecca |last2=Pearson |first2=Joel |title=Revisiting the blind mind: Still no evidence for sensory visual imagery in individuals with aphantasia |journal=Neuroscience Research |date=April 2024 |volume=201 |pages=27–30 |doi=10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.008 |pmid=38311033 |doi-access=free }}</ref> follow-up with over 50 participants further confirmed the absence of sensory imagery in aphantasia, adding evidence to the field of study. Zeman<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Zeman |first1=Adam |title=Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes |journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences |date=May 2024 |volume=28 |issue=5 |pages=467–480 |doi=10.1016/j.tics.2024.02.007 |pmid=38548492 |doi-access=free }}</ref> also proposes that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for extreme variations in visual imagery.

In 2024, a research team led by Jonathan Rhodes from the [[University of Plymouth]] assessed the imagery abilities of over 300 athletes finding a small sample of 27 who had aphantasia or low imagery abilities. The researchers developed a training program over six weeks to improve imagery ability, finding that it can be significantly improved for the majority of participants.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Rhodes J, May J, Nedza K, Clements L | title = Imagery training for athletes with low imagery abilities | date = April 2024 |journal=Journal of Applied Sport Psychology | volume = 36 | issue = 5 |pages=831–844 |doi=10.1080/10413200.2024.2337019| doi-access=free }}</ref> In addition, the research of Keogh and Pearson's<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Keogh |first1=Rebecca |last2=Pearson |first2=Joel |title=Revisiting the blind mind: Still no evidence for sensory visual imagery in individuals with aphantasia |journal=Neuroscience Research |date=April 2024 |volume=201 |pages=27–30 |doi=10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.008 |pmid=38311033 |doi-access=free }}</ref> follow-up with over 50 participants further confirmed the absence of sensory imagery in aphantasia, adding evidence to the field of study. Zeman<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Zeman |first1=Adam |title=Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes |journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences |date=May 2024 |volume=28 |issue=5 |pages=467–480 |doi=10.1016/j.tics.2024.02.007 |pmid=38548492 |doi-access=free }}</ref> also proposes that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for extreme variations in visual imagery.

== Aphantasia as a disruption in the integration of autonomic and interoceptive signals ==

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The interoceptive view of aphantasia, proposed in recent peer-reviewed publications<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Silvanto |first1=Juha |last2=Nagai |first2=Yoko |date=2025-02-06 |title=How Interoception and the Insula Shape Mental Imagery and Aphantasia |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10548-025-01101-6 |journal=Brain Topography |language=en |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=27 |doi=10.1007/s10548-025-01101-6 |pmid=39912831 |issn=1573-6792}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Silvanto |first=Juha |date=2025-05-07 |title=Interoception, insula, and agency: a predictive coding account of aphantasia |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |language=English |volume=16 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1564251 |doi-access=free |pmid=40400740 |pmc=12092441 |issn=1664-1078}}</ref> by Juha Silvanto and Yoko Nagai, proposes that mental imagery is not purely a visual or sensory process, but rather a form of embodied simulation grounded in internal bodily states. According to this perspective, the inability to generate mental images in aphantasia arises from disruptions in interoception—the brain’s ability to detect, interpret, and integrate signals from the body, such as heart rate, respiration, and visceral sensations.

This model emphasizes that vivid imagery depends on more than just activity in visual regions; it also requires the integration of interoceptive information that imbues images with emotional tone, a sense of ownership, and volitional control. Brain areas such as the insula and anterior cingulate cortex play a key role in this process by combining bodily signals with top-down predictions about sensory experiences. When interoceptive precision is reduced—either through underdevelopment or adaptive suppression—this integration fails, leading to diminished imagery vividness or a complete lack of conscious imagery.

Congenital aphantasia may reflect a lifelong failure to develop the neural architecture required to integrate bodily and sensory signals. In contrast, acquired aphantasia may emerge as a protective mechanism, in which the brain dampens imagery and bodily simulation to cope with overwhelming autonomic input or emotional distress. This account aligns with predictive coding frameworks, which suggest that imprecise interoceptive predictions lead to insufficient gain on top-down signals, preventing imagery from reaching awareness.

This interoceptive disruption may also explain the high rates of alexithymia, emotional blunting, and depersonalization reported in some individuals with aphantasia. Rather than viewing aphantasia as a narrowly defined visual deficit, the interoceptive account reframes it as a broader disturbance of embodied mental simulation—a failure to integrate sensory and bodily signals into coherent internal experiences.

==Notable people with aphantasia==

==Notable people with aphantasia==